Swarajya, July 21, 1962
The secret of prosperity is greater production. The secret of production in all countries, and specially in a country with a large population like ours, is honest, unremitting labour. And the secret of honest unremitting work is a motive power that pushes men to it, viz., something proportionate they will get for themselves by such work and the protection of such earnings from plunder by others, which the State gives. It is for this, that governments have been set up in civilized countries.
There is the problem of protecting the consumer against the producer who markets the products of his labour. This is provided for, if producers are allowed to multiply freely—without controls and restrictions—and are compelled to offer their products in a competitive market.
The great protection of the consumer lies in competition in production, not the bureaucrat. The greatest incentive for production is assurance against plunder. In countries where some families or groups of traders have seized power, and oligarchies rule either openly or through the pulling of strings in so-called democracies, a few people plunder the many; and the people are at the mercy of the few.
When the law takes from the people more than it ought to, in the name of running services which should be left to the frugal management and care of individuals instead of being left to spend-thrifty bureaucrats, it is ‘legal’ plunder, and the legalization does not reduce the evil: it does not help production. The incentive for investment and for work and careful management is reduced with consequent fall in production.
The secret of prosperity is greater production. The secret of production in all countries, and specially in a country with a large population like ours, is honest, unremitting labour. And the secret of honest unremitting work is a motive power that pushes men to it, viz., something proportionate they will get for themselves by such work and the protection of such earnings from plunder by others, which the State gives. It is for this, that governments have been set up in civilized countries.
There is the problem of protecting the consumer against the producer who markets the products of his labour. This is provided for, if producers are allowed to multiply freely—without controls and restrictions—and are compelled to offer their products in a competitive market. If any attempt is made to protect the consumer by parties in power, selecting the good and honest producer by a system of licences, we create two dangerous conditions. One is that we give to ministers and officials the occasion to commit many errors of judgment or to behave unfairly and go corrupt. The other evil is that a monopoly is created compelling the consumer to accept services of goods that may not suit or satisfy him. Where the government, i.e., ministers and officials, become the holders of the monopoly, the evil becomes even more aggravated. There is available an appeal against the private monopolist to the government; but there is no appeal from the government when it holds the monopoly itself.
Problems are solved only by getting at the root of the trouble and removing the cause of it, not by enactment of more and more laws and regulations or by the creation of more and more government agencies, and the taking of more and more power by the ministers and the bureaucracy. But this is the cheap attempt at solution which Statist regimes always adopt. As one fault leads to another and the chain of faults is lengthened, one regulation leads to another and that to yet another and so on—the lengthening chain of rules and controls and the increasing burden of officers to be maintained by the exchequer. An entanglement of regulations and controls increases government expenditure and is ineffective.
The great protection of the consumer lies in competition in production, not the bureaucrat. The greatest incentive for production is assurance against plunder. In countries where some families or groups of traders have seized power, and oligarchies rule either openly or through the pulling of strings in so-called democracies, a few people plunder the many; and the people are at the mercy of the few. When the law takes from the people more than it ought to, in the name of running services which should be left to the frugal management and care of individuals instead of being left to spend-thrifty bureaucrats, it is ‘legal’ plunder, and the legalization does not reduce the evil: it does not help production. The incentive for investment and for work and careful management is reduced with consequent fall in production. When everybody plunders everybody, as in the permit-licence-raj that now prevails here, it is hopeless, except in the case of a very favoured few who can be named in each case, to expect competitive exertion or competitive investment or competitive service to the cause of national prosperity.
Political parties seek the favour of groups by openly or secretly giving, or promising to give, privileges at the expense of others; perpetuation of power is thereby procured, which means perpetuation of the condition of everybody plundering everybody. “Corruption is the inevitable result when one party or one faction remains too long in power,” said a recent US Senate report.
